Abstract-Secure multi-party computation is a practical cryptographic method for processing confidential data. Research progress has led to its use in privacy-preserving statistical analysis. Implementations of simple statistical analysis functions have been published, but no comprehensive tool has been built. We describe and implement a suite of most used statistical analysis functions in the privacy-preserving setting including simple statistics, t-test, chi-squared test, Wilcoxon tests and linear regression. We give descriptions of the privacy-preserving algorithms and benchmark results that show an order of magnitude improvement over previous work.
D
IGITAL databases exist wherever modern computing technology is used. These databases often contain private data, e.g., the behaviour of customers or citizens. Today's data analysis technologies require that the analysts have direct access to the data, thus creating a risk to privacy. Even if data analysts are diligent and keep secrets, the data in their possession can leak through an external attack.
Standard cryptography protects databases until the data are processed. However, today's analysis tools require us to decrypt data before processing, bringing us back to the privacy problem. Emerging cryptographic technologies like secure multi-party computation (SMC) solve the problem by allowing data to be processed in encrypted form.
We interviewed statisticians to determined their expectations towards SMC technology [1] . They saw potential, but also had concerns. First, statisticians were used to seeing individual values and were unsure if they can find errors and ensure analytical precision, if SMC-based systems only disclose the results of aggregating queries.
The second concern was the lack of user-friendly tools. Statisticians are used to the workflows of tools like SAS, SPSS and R. The interviewees expected a drop-in replacement of their environment with the new privacy guarantees.
In this paper, we describe a suite of algorithms for privacy-preserving statistical analysis using SMC. We implement these algorithms in RMIND, a cryptographically private statistical analysis tool designed to provide a similar experience to existing scriptable tools such as R. 1 RMIND provides tools to support all stages of statistical analysis-data collection, exploration, preparation and analysis. Our Contribution. This paper makes major improvements on top of our earlier work on privacy-preserving statistics [1] , [2] . First, we designed new privacy-preserving algorithms for statistical testing including value correction methods for multiple testing.
Second, we designed privacy-preserving algorithms for multivariate linear regression based on solving a set of linear equations based on Gaussian elimination with backsubstitution, LU decomposition and also a conjugate gradient method for minimising quadratic forms.
Third, we created RMIND, a privacy-preserving statistical analysis environment supporting a complete data analysis process based on SMC where data are collected from various sources, linked and statistically analysed. We designed the user interface to be similar to that of R to resolve user acceptance issues.
Fourth, we showed the practical feasibility of RMIND by measuring our optimised implementation of its algorithms. Furthermore, we refer to a large-scale validation of RMIND in which it was used to combine and analyse real-world tax and education records with regulatory approval.
Related Work. The closest system to what we propose has been introduced by Chida et al. in [3] . They are using the statistics environment R to create a user interface to a secure multi-party computation backend. They have implemented descriptive statistics, filtering, cross-tabulation and a version of the t-test and x 2 test. Their protocols combine public and private calculations and provide impressive performance. However, their implementation is limited in the kinds of analyses they can perform due to their lack of support for real numbers. Their implementation also does not support linking different database tables.
Another recent implementation with similar goals is by El Emam et al [4] . They provide protocols for only linking and the computation of x 2 tests, odds ratio and relative risk. Other published results have focused on individual components in our statistics suite, e.g, mean, variance, frequency analysis and regression [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , filtered sums, weighted sums and scalar products [10] , [11] , [12] . Related papers on private data aggregation have also targeted streaming data [13] , [14] .
The main advantage of this work is the integration of all algorithms in a single tool. Algorithms in related works are hard to combine with each other due to different underlying secure multi-party computation techniques.
DESIGNING A SECURE STATISTICS TOOL

Requirements for a Secure Statistical Analysis Tool
There is a perceived need for cryptographic security in the following privacy-preserving data integration scenario [1] .
1) Data owners and analysts agree on the input database formats and the study plan. 2) Data owners upload their input databases to the analysis system. 3) Data analysts send queries that are allowed according to the study plan. 4) Analysts receive analysis results and interpret them in a resulting report. We propose a tool for performing privacy-preserving statistical studies in the given setting using secure multi-party computation. The difference between RMIND and standard statistical tools is that RMIND collects and analyses data in encrypted form without decrypting them and gives provable privacy guarantees to the analysis process. This efficiently ensures that the data owner is the only party with access to the private inputs and only the results of the analysis are disclosed to the analyst. RMIND is designed with the following goals.
1) User interface is similar to existing analysis tools.
2) Public and private data are separated at import. 3) Private data is automatically processed with SMC. 4) Tool implements transformations and analysis algorithms that statisticians most commonly use. The main components of RMIND are shown in Fig. 1 . RMIND has its own data import tool, but it can also be integrated with existing databases. The RMIND service is built by combining the algorithms in this paper with a secure computing system. The RMIND data analysis tool is an R-like front end that parses the analysts queries and sends them to the service for secure execution.
Secure Multi-Party Computing with External Parties
Secure multi-party computation is a cryptographic technology for computing a function with multiple parties where only the party who provided a particular input can see that input and every party only gets the output specifically intended for them. Parties P 1 ; . . . ; P n jointly evaluate a function fðx 1 ; . . . ; x n Þ with outputs ðy 1 ; . . . ; y n Þ so that P i submits its input x i and learns the output y i and nothing about the other inputs and outputs. Not all parties in our data integration scenario have the resources and motivation to participate equally in the secure analysis. Therefore, we consider three different party types. Input parties (data owners) provide the inputs to the analysis and expect that nobody else learns them. Computing parties store inputs, participate in secure multi-party computation protocols and give outputs to the result parties (the analysts).
SMC protocols can be built using homomorphic encryption [15] , [16] , garbled circuits [17] and secret sharing [18] , [19] , among others. All of these can provide a set of composable cryptographic primitives that implement the secure arithmetic we need for the statistical operations.
There are a number of SMC implementations available. Some provide secure integer arithmetic [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , floating point arithmetic [27] , [28] , shuffling and sorting [29] and linking [4] . To our knowledge, only the Sharemind framework provides all the operations in a single implementation [30] , [31] , [32] , [33] , [34] .
Secure Operations Needed for Statistical Analysis
The privacy-preserving statistical analysis algorithms in this paper are independent of a particular SMC approach. Instead, we assume the existence of an abstract set of SMC protocols, or a protection domain kind (PDK) as defined in [35] .
Definition 1 (Protection domain kind).
A protection domain kind is a set of data representations, algorithms and protocols for storing and computing on protected data.
To implement the necessary functionality for statistical analysis, we require the existence of privacy-preserving operations listed in Table 1 . The arithmetic operations are used for implementing statistical functions. Secure linking and sorting are required for preparing data tables for analysis. We also require a cryptographically private shuffling protocol that can randomly rearrange the values in a vector or rows in a matrix without leaking the elements.
In the ideal model, the input party encrypts its input x to get ½½x. Then, it sends ½½x to the computing party CP who computes ½½y fð½½xÞ using PDK operations and sends ½½y to the result party who will decrypt it to learn y. With a secure PDK, CP learns nothing about x or y in the process.
The threat models for different PDKs vary. For example, threats for a hardware-assisted PDK include backdoors and design flaws. For SMC, the main threat is that computing parties collude to reveal private inputs. PDKs also differ in their security assumptions and guarantees, e.g., they may remain private only when there is an honest majority, or withstand malicious tampering. Stronger security guarantees often come at a cost of computational power. Security against passive adversaries (who do not modify software but try to learn private values from its state) is sufficient for processing personal data when the computing parties are organisations with a legal responsibility to protect privacy.
One example of a practical PDK is secure multi-party computation on additively secret shared data [36] . If an input party wants to provide a secret value x 2 Z (where Z is a quotient ring) as a private input to n computing parties, it uniformly generates shares x 1 ; . . . ; x nÀ1 Z and calculates the final share x n x À x 1 À Á Á Á À x nÀ1 . Each computing party receives one share x i that it stores as ½½x. Each share x i is just a uniformly distributed value, no computing party can learn anything about x without colluding with others.
Computing parties can process the shares without recovering the secret. If each computing party has shares x i and y i of secrets x and y, they can calculate z i x i þ y i to get the shares of z ¼ x þ y. Further operations in this protection domain kind require more complex protocols, as described in [30] , [36] . The privacy and composability proof framework for the cited protocols is found in [37] .
Our algorithms are highly applicable also for fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) systems and hardware isolation platforms (e.g., the Software Guard Extensions (SGX) feature in Intel's Skylake CPUs). While both FHE and SGX provide cryptographic privacy, they still require algorithms that prevent leakage through side channels and outputs.
Limiting the Leakage of Private Inputs
In our setting, data owners and analysts agree on a study plan with a list of results that can be published. Ideally, no information about the private inputs is revealed during the computations or in the outputs. However, this is impossible to achieve, as all practically useful outputs contain information about the private inputs.
Instead of forbidding leakage, we will use automatically enforced mechanisms to minimise it. We implement controlled statistics-our statistical tool will only publish results that the data owners and computing parties have cleared for publishing. This approach has been shown to be a sufficient and legally acceptable way of protecting personal information and tax secrets in social studies [38] .
The privacy-preserving algorithms in this paper are designed to minimise leakage using a combination of techniques that follow the following privacy goals. [39] . Hence, we can omit the security proofs of such algorithms in this paper (Algorithms 3, 7, 8, 10) .
The remaining algorithms are not straight line programs and require separate security proofs. Most of these algorithms (Algorithms 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9) declassify the size of the filtered subgroup, which is assumed to be public or is a desired output according to the study plan. We declassify certain filter sizes during analysis so that the computing parties can reduce the amount of PDK operations they have to perform. For example, the cut function reduces the amount of data to be processed by declassifying the size of the dataset that matches a search criterion, which is usually an allowed output of the study.
Three remaining algorithms (Algorithms 11, 12, 13) declassify values that are independent of input data and thus preserve privacy. Fortunately, it is sufficient to analyse their security in a hybrid model where abstract operations with private values reveal no information and an attacking computing party can make decisions only based on values that are declassified during the computations. Consequently, we must show that the transcript of values declassified during runtime can be simulated knowing only the final published results of the algorithm. If this assumption is satisfied, then the implementation in the hybrid model can be shown to be cryptographically secure. As the composition theorem from [39] assures that the security of the hybrid implementation does not degrade when we replace all abstract operations with the actual PDK operations. As long as all of them are universally composable, we have formally shown that our implementation is cryptographically secure.
Goal 2: Source Privacy. An algorithm for computing fðx 1 ; . . . ; x m Þ is source-private if all outputs and all intermediate values do not depend on the order of inputs. If an algorithm for computing fðx 1 ; . . . ; x m Þ is cryptographically secure, it is sufficient to prove that the output distributions of fðx 1 ; . . . ; x m Þ and fðx pð1Þ ; . . . ; x pðmÞ Þ coincide for all permutations of inputs p.
Source privacy ensures that the computing parties are not capable of linking computation results with the private inputs of a specific input party. For instance, the simple sum x 1 þ Á Á Á þ x n is source private and, thus, it does not reveal the relation between input parties and their inputs even if we somehow know the values of x 1 ; . . . ; x n . All algorithms in this paper are source-private. Straight line programs with no declassified values are trivially source-private, because their data access patterns are independent of the inputs. As the rest of the algorithms are not dependent on the order of inputs, we make them source private by obliviously shuffling the inputs before the actual computations.
Goal 3: Query Restrictions. A privacy-preserving statistical analysis system enforces query restrictions if it has a mechanism for the input parties to control which computations can be performed by the computing parties on the private inputs and which results can be published to the result parties. In most practical secure computing techniques, input parties have greater control over the process, if they or their representatives also host a computing party.
With RMIND, parties negotiate a study plan that describes the computations to be performed and their publishable results. This study plan is implemented on the RMIND tool in its query language. The backend publishes allowed results using the publish operation in the PDK used by the system. Forbidden queries can be removed from the RMIND backend by deleting the algorithms supporting it. RMIND enforces these restrictions by requiring that computing parties have exactly the same version of the study plan code deployed at the time of execution. The result party can only run queries for which the necessary algorithms are deployed and input parties cannot upload new code to perform a query. In future implementations, we can improve the user experience by integrating query policy languages such as [40] and [41] , but this remains a future goal.
Goal 4: Output Privacy. An algorithm is output-private, if its published results do not leak the private inputs. Output privacy cannot be absolute, as this way we learn nothing useful from the inputs. In practice, the amount of allowable leakage is strongly application-dependent. In some settings, input parties will perform a privacy impact assessment of the publishable outputs and decide what can be published.
The quantification of output privacy should be defined on mathematical formalisations like k-anonymity [42] and differential privacy [43] . Achieving these goals comes with the cost of reduced precision. The analysts must accept either noisy or coarse-grained results. However, k-anonymity does not protect against attackers with background information. Differential privacy guarantees security against attackers with unbounded background knowledge, provided that the result parties are willing to accept a potentially unbounded amount of noise added to results [44] .
It is possible to implement secure output randomisation that provides differential guarantees similar to the seminal work [43] . However, it must be a separate layer, as in statistical studies, the customers often expect precise results regardless of privacy implications. Also, the amount of accessible background information is limited in a typical statistical study, or otherwise the study would be redundant.
RMIND can be extended with differentially private statistical algorithms, but this requires defining a flavour of differential privacy that faithfully models the bounded nature of background information in statistical studies without inconsistencies. This remains a goal for future work.
Designing Efficient Privacy-Preserving Algorithms
Protection domain kinds have specific performance profiles. For example, PDKs based on secret sharing, are significantly more efficient when the algorithms perform many parallel operations together [30] . Similar effects have been noted in other PDKs, see e.g., [45] . Essentially, a hundred simultaneous multiplications take about the same time as a single one.
This gives us the challenge of designing privacy-preserving algorithms with massive parallelism in addition to making their runtime independent from private inputs. One way to achieve this is to find a straight-line algorithm and redesign it for parallelism. The other, of course, is to take a massively parallel algorithm designed, e.g., for GPUs and redesign it to be private.
DATA IMPORT AND FILTERING
We now present a collection of algorithms for performing privacy-preserving statistical analyses. We begin with the first steps in the statistical analysis process-acquiring and preparing the data.
First, let us look at the case where data are collected for a specific study. In such studies, data are entered by a data collector (e.g., national census or a clinical trial) or by data donors themselves (e.g., an online survey) and the joint database is considered to be horizontally partitioned. With secure multi-party computation, the data are encrypted or secret-shared immediately at the source and stored in a privacy-preserving manner.
Second, consider the case where datasets previously exist and analysts wish to perform a study by combining data from several different databases that cannot be joined publicly into a new vertically partitioned database. Then, data can be imported from these databases by encrypting or secret-sharing them and later merging them in a privacypreserving way.
Availability Mask Vectors
There are two options for dealing with missing values in an input database: a special value in the data domain can be used for denoting a missing value; or an extra variable can be added for each datavariable. The first option is not practical in the privacy-preserving domain, as the use of a special value adds an expensive private comparison operation to nearly every statistical operation.
Using an extra variable is much more practical, as only one private bit of extra data needs to be stored per value. The latter uses extra storage space of N Á k Á b bits, where N is the number of entries, k is the number of variables, and b is the smallest data unit that can be stored in the database.
Let the availability mask ½½m of vector ½½ã contain 0 if the corresponding value in the variable ½½ã is missing and 1 otherwise. It is clear, that it is not possible to discern which and how many values are missing from the value vector by looking at the private availability vector. However, the sum of the values in the availability mask yields the count of available elements.
Input Validation
Input validation and data correction (e.g., range and type checks) are operations used to improve data quality. The values for acceptable ranges and types are specified by the analyst but they are applied to the data automatically. Input validation and data correction can be performed at two stages-during data import before applying cryptographic protection, or afterwards, in the protected database using SMC. Validating inputs early is faster, but it increases the complexity of the import tool.
To perform a range check on a private vector ½½ã of values, we construct a vector ½½c containing the constant with which we want to compare the values. We then compare the two vectors point-wise and get a private vector ½½m of comparison results, where ½½m i ½½a i ⊛½½c i , where ⊛ is a comparison operation, i 2 1; . . . ; n f g , and n is the size of vectors ½½ã; ½½c and ½½m. The privacy-preserving range check results in a private mask vector ½½m that can be used in further computations. To find out how many values are within range, it suffices to sum the values in vector ½½m.
Evaluating Filters and Isolating Filtered Data
Similarly to range checks, filtering can be performed by comparing a vector ½½ã of values point-wise to a vector ½½c containing filter values. As a result, we obtain a mask vector ½½m that contains 1 if the condition holds and 0 otherwise. For a more complex filter, the comparisons are done separately and the resulting mask vectors are combined using conjunction and disjunction.
For example, to find all women who have had a degree in statistical analysis for more than 5 years, we will first make three comparisons ½½p ð½½ã ¼ ''F ''Þ, ½½q ð½½b ¼ ''statistics''Þ, and ½½r ð½½c > 5Þ, where ½½ã contains values for gender, ½½b contains values for a person's specialty, and ½½c contains values for years since graduation. As the filters themselves are privacy-preserving, it is not possible to distinguish which records correspond to the filter conditions. To get the combined filter, we need to privately compute ½½m ½½p^½½q^½½r. Most of the algorithms presented in this paper are designed so that filter information is taken into account during computations. On the other hand, some algorithms require that a subset vector containing only the filtered data be built. We use Algorithm 1 for selecting a subset based on a given filter in a privacy-preserving way using mask vectors.
Algorithm 1. Privacy-Preserving Algorithm Cut for Filtering a Private Data Vector According to a Private Mask
Input: Data vector ½½ã and mask vector ½½m, both of size N Output: Data vector ½½x of size n that contains only elements of ½½ã corresponding to the mask ½½m 1: Obliviously shuffle the rows in matrix ½½M, where
First the value and mask vector pairs are shuffled in a privacy-preserving way, retaining the correspondence of the elements. Next, the mask vector is declassified and values for which the mask vector contains 0 are removed from the value vector. The obtained subset vector is then returned.
Lemma 3.1: If operations in the PDK are universally composable, then Algorithm 1 leaks only the number of non-zero elements in the input mask filter.
Proof: In short, due to oblivious shuffle the elements ofs are in unknown random order [31] . Hence, it is trivial to simulate the results of the declassify protocol-it suffices to fix n ones in random locations.
More formally, we first define the trusted third party T in the ideal implementation as follows: T takes in vectors ½½ã and ½½m and submits ½½x to computing parties, wherex consists of a i satisfying m i ¼ 1, in random order. In the hybrid world, we must simulate all actions given only the shares of ½½x corresponding to corrupted computing parties. The number of such shares reveals the number of elements n in the subset. To simulate the outcomes of the oblivious shuffle protocol, we fix n random locations among N cells. To get shares of the elements in the permuted vector ½½ã, we insert elements of ½½x one-byone into these slots and fill the remaining slots with ½½0. To simulate vector ½½s, we insert ½½1 to the slots corresponding to the locations where elements of ½½x were inserted and fill the remaining slots with ½½0. We then open the vector ½½s to the attacker who observes no difference, as all operations are ideal.
Also, note that the order of shares ½½x matches: if corrupted parties behave honestly, their shares of ½½x are in the same order as specified by T . Consequently, the hybrid protocol is cryptographically secure. The security of the PDK implementation follows directly form the universal composability of shuffling and declassification operations. t u
DATA QUALITY ASSURANCE
Encryption and secret sharing protect database contents from all users, including system administrators. However, this also prevents the data analyst from seeing the data, detecting patterns and formulating hypotheses. Rmind solves this by providing privacy-preserving aggregation functions that describe the data. The leakage is controlled by limiting allowable descriptive statistics in the study plan.
Five-Number Summary
Box plots are a common tool for giving a visual overview of the data distribution and for effectively drawing attention to outliers. Box plots are drawn from the fivenumber summary containing the quantiles for the minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile and maximum of an variable. As no one method for quantile estimation has been widely agreed upon in the statistics community, we use algorithm Q 7 from [46] used by the R software. Let p be the percentile we want to find and let ½½ã be a vector sorted in ascending order. The quantile is then found by calculating
where j ¼ bðn À 1Þpc þ 1, n is the size of vector ½½ã, and g ¼ np À bðn À 1Þpc À p. Algorithm 2 uses Q to privately calculate the fivenumber summary. It uses Algorithm 1 to remove the filtered values and then sorts the filtered values to speed up random lookup. The algorithm leaks the subset size, but as it uses cut followed by a straight line program, the universal composability property of the PDK and the cut security proof make it cryptographically secure. Algorithm 3 hides the subset size by calculating quantile positions using PDK operations and then performing all lookups privately. This is possible, as filtered-out values are sorted to the beginning of the vector. This algorithm is a straight line program of PDK operations and, therefore, cryptographically secure.
Data Density Estimation
The distribution of an variable gives important insights into the data. For categorical variables, the distribution can be discerned by counting the occurrences of different values. For numerical variable, we must split the range into bins specified by breaks and compute the frequencies in each bin. The frequency tables can be visualised as a histogram. [47] . Finally, on lines 6-9, the elements belonging in each bin are counted using PDK operations. For categorical variables, we use category values instead of calculating bins. All comparisons can be done in parallel to speed up the algorithm.
Simple Statistical Measures
To calculate means, variances and covariances in a privacypreserving way, we multiply point-wise the value vector ½½ã of size N with the mask vector ½½m to find ½½x. If the function has multiple inputs, we use the conjunction of the mask vectors which leaves us with values that are available in all inputs. The number of remaining values ½½n is computed as a sum of the mask vector. The arithmetic mean, and the unbiased estimates of variance, standard deviation and covariance are computed with PDK operations as follows:
Furthermore, if n is allowed to be public, we can use division with a public divisor and public square root instead, as they are faster than the private versions.
Univariate Outlier Detection
It is common to mark values in a data vector ½½ã smaller than the 5 percent quantile or larger than 95 percent quantile as outliers. The corresponding mask vector is computed by comparing all elements of ½½ã to Qð0:05; ½½ãÞ and Qð0:95; ½½ãÞ, and then conjuncting the resulting with other mask vectors as necessary.
Another generic measure of eliminating outliers from a dataset is using median absolute deviation [48] , [49] (MAD). Element ½½x is considered an outlier in a value vector ½½ã of length n if and is a constant. The exact value of is generally between 3 to 5, but it can be specified depending on the dataset.
STATISTICAL TESTS
The Principles of Statistical Testing
Statisticians often compare observations of two groups, referred to as the case and control populations. In the following, we will use two mask vectors that separate these groups. More specifically, let ½½ã be the value vector and let ½½ca and ½½co be mask vectors for case and control groups, respectively. Then ½½n ca ¼ sumð½½caÞ and ½½n co ¼ sumð½½coÞ are the counts of subjects in the corresponding populations. Fig. 2 gives an overview of the steps for statistical testing in the private and public setting. In a normal statistical testing procedure, we first compute the test statistic based on the data. Next, we compute the p-value based on the obtained value and the size of the sample. Finally, we compare the p-value to a significance threshold set by the analyst. In the privacy-preserving setting, we have two options of how to carry out this procedure. The choice depends on how much information we are willing to publish.
Option 1 is similar to the public setting, with the difference that the test statistic is computed in a privacy-preserving manner. It is then published along with the sample sizes, the p-value is computed publicly and compared to the given threshold value. The function that converts the test statistic to into the p-value is always monotone and depends only on the sizes of case and control groups. Consequently, it can be always inverted if sample sizes are public. Hence, publishing the test statistic is equivalent to revealing the p-value together with the sizes of case and control groups.
However, revealing the sizes of the case and control groups or the raw p-value might sometimes reveal too much information. For this occasion, we propose Option 2, where the test statistic is computed based on the data in a privacy-preserving manner. The data analyst determines the threshold, and the critical p-value and the corresponding test statistic are publicly determined based on this threshold. Finally, the test statistic is compared to the critical test statistic using PDK operations. The only thing that is published is the decision whether the alternative hypothesis is supported by the data.
Student's T-Tests
The two-sample Student's t-test is the simplest statistical tests that allows us to determine whether the difference of group means is significant or not compared to variability in groups. There are two common flavours of this test [50] depending on whether the variability of the populations is equal. Let ½½x ½½ã Á ½½ca and ½½ỹ ½½ã Á ½½co, then ½½x is the data of the case population and ½½ỹ is the data of the control population. where sdevð½½x; ½½ỹÞ estimates the common standard deviation of the two samples and is computed as follows: A paired t-test [50] is used to detect whether a significant change has taken place in cases where there is a direct oneto-one dependence between case and control group elements, for example, the data consists of measurements from the same subject. Let ½½x and ½½ỹ be the paired measurements, and let n be the count of these measurements. The test statistic for the paired t-test is computed in the following way:
The formulae can be represented with straight-line programs, making the whole calculation privacy-preserving, if PDK operations are used.
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test and Signed Rank Test
The Wilcoxon rank sum test and its improvement MannWhitney U test [51] work on the assumption that the distributions in the case and control groups differ significantly. Algorithm 5 calculates the test statistic ½½w using the Mann-Whitney U test. The filtering in this algorithm must retain elements from both groups-cases and controls. On line 1, we combine the two mask vectors into one. The function cut is the same as before, except that several vectors are cut at once based on the combined filter ½½m. Next, the value and mask vectors are sorted based on the values of ½½x so that the relation between the values and mask elements is retained.
The rank function on line 5 shares and assigns an integer i 2 1; . . . ; n f gto all values in the sorted vector based on the location of the value. If some values in the sorted vector are equal, all of these elements are assigned the average of their ranks using private comparison and division. This correction makes the algorithm significantly slower as this requires us to keep all the ranks as floating point values instead of integers. It is possible to use this test without the correction which makes it give a stricter bound and might not accept borderline hypotheses, but the algorithm will work faster. Line 6, multiplies the rank vector ½½r with the case and control masks to find the ranks belonging to the case and control groups.
Similarly to Student's paired t-test, the Wilcoxon signedrank test [52] is a paired difference test. Our version, given in Algorithm 6, takes into account Pratt's correction [51] for when the values are equal and their difference is 0. Filtering is performed similarly to Algorithm 5. Next, the difference ½½d between the two data samples is found, followed by the computation of the absolute value and sign of ½½d. We expect that the latter is the standard function that returns À1 when the element is negative, 1 if it is positive and 0 otherwise.
The signs are then sorted based on the absolute values ½½d 0 (line 4) and the ranking function rank 0 is called. This ranking function is otherwise similar to the function rank, but differs in the fact that we also need to exclude the differences that have the value 0. Let the number of 0 values in vector ½½d be ½½k. As ½½d has been sorted based on absolute values, the 0 values are at the beginning of the vector so it is possible to use ½½k as the offset for our ranks. Function rank 0 assigns ½½r i 0 while ½½s i ¼ 0, and works similarly to rank on the rest of the vector ½½s, with the difference that i 2 1; . . . ; ½½n À k f g . As the first operation cut is followed by a straight line program in both algorithms, the universal composability property of the PDK together with the security proof of function cut is sufficient for the cryptographic security of both algorithms.
The x 2 Tests for Consistency
If the variable values are discrete such as income categories then it is impossible to apply t-tests or their non-parametric counterparts and we have to analyse frequencies of certain values in the dataset. The corresponding statistical test is known as the x 2 test. The standard x 2 test statistic is computed as
where f ji is the observed frequency and e ji is the expected frequency of the ith option and jth group. As we are working with two populations, we can simplify this formula as
and present the frequencies in a contingency table (Table 2) . We use a public codebook CB to give the analyst the possibility to choose, which values will be converted into which option in the contingency table. This matrix essentially holds the possible values of the variable in the first column, and the option they will belong to, in the second. 
Algorithm 7. Privacy-Preserving Algorithm for Compiling the Contingency
Bonferroni Correction
Let a be the significance threshold and let k be the number of tests applied on the same data. Then the Bonferroni correction simply reassigns the same significance threshold a ¼ a=k to all tests. As a result, Bonferroni correction is trivial to implement, we just have to use the corrected significance thresholdâ of all privacy-preserving statistical tests.
Benjamini-Hochberg Procedure
Bonferroni correction is often too harsh compared to false discovery rate correction. Unfortunately, FDR is not as straightforward to apply in the privacy-preserving setting as multiple testing p-values must remain private. Therefore, we look at the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure [53] . The BH procedure first orders p-values in ascending order and then finds the largest i such that
where p ðiÞ is the ith p-value and k is the number of hypotheses.
Recall that, for any statistical test, the correspondence between between p-values and test statistics is anti-monotone. Namely, for any significance threshold a we can find a value QðaÞ such that for any value of the test statistic t ! QðaÞ the corresponding p-value is less than a. As a result, the Benjamini-Hochberg criterion can be expressed in terms of decreasingly ordered test statistics
For most tests, the function Q is computed as the upper quantile of a distribution that depends only on the size of the case and control group. Hence, we can publicly compute fractional approximations of significance thresholds q ðiÞ % Q ia k ;
and use secure computing to evaluate comparisons t ðiÞ ! q ðiÞ . Algorithm 9 depicts the corresponding privacy-preserving significance testing procedure, which reveals only the locations c i and ordering of significant test statistics. We can hide the ordering, if the shares ½½c ð1Þ ; . . . ; ½½c ði Ã Þ are obliviously shuffled before opening. The number of revealed zeroes is equal to the number of significant hypotheses, so can directly simulate the published values knowing only the desired outcome. The formal security proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.1.
PREDICTIVE MODELLING
Linear regression is the most commonly used method for predicting values of variables based on other existing variables. It can also be used to find out if and how strongly certain variables influence other variables in a dataset. Let us consider k independent variable vectors of n elements, i.e, X ¼ ðX j;i Þ, where i 2 0; . . . ; k f gand j 2 1; . . . ; n f g . The vector X j;0 ¼ ð1Þ is an added variable for the constant term. Letỹ ¼ ðy j Þ be the vector of dependent variables. We estimate the unknown coefficientsb ¼ ðb i Þ such that
where the vector of errors" ¼ ð" j Þ is assumed to be white Gaussian noise. This list of equations can be compactly written as" ¼ Xb Àỹ. Most methods for linear regression try to minimise the square of residuals
This can be done directly or by first converting the task into its equivalent characterization in terms of linear equations
Let us first look at simple linear regression, where the aim of the analysis is to findâ andb that fit the approximation y i % b 0 þ b 1 x i best for all data points. Then the corresponding linear equation (2) As we have the capability to compute covariance and variance in the privacy-preserving setting, we can also estimate the values ofb 0 andb 1 in this setting. We present three methods for solving the system (2) with more than one explanatory variable. For k < 4, we invert the matrix by computing determinants. For the general case, we give algorithms for the Gaussian elimination method [54] and LU decomposition [54] . We also describe the conjugate gradient method [55] that minimises the square of residuals (1) .
In all these algorithms, we assume that the data matrix has already been multiplied with its transpose: ½½A ¼ ½½X T ½½X and the dependent variable has been multiplied with the transpose of the data matrix: ½½b ¼ ½½X T ½½ỹ. All algebraic operations needed for this can be built with available PDK operations.
In the privacy-preserving setting, matrix inversion using determinants is a straightforward application of algebraic operations so we will not discuss it in length. For the more general methods, we first give an algorithm that finds pivot elements by finding the first maximum element in a vector and returning its location in the vector. While the Gaussian and LU decomposition algorithms can be used without pivoting, it is not advisable as the algorithms are numerically unstable in the presence of any roundoff errors [54] .
Algorithm 10 describes the function maxLoc that finds the pivot element and its location from a given vector. To avoid leaking information about equal values in a vector, the indices are first permuted to ensure cryptographic privacy. This means that the indices are traversed in a random order during each execution. On line 4, the current maximum element is compared with the element that is being viewed. On lines 5 and 6 the value and its location are determined obliviously. Namely, if the new element was larger, it will be considered as the new maximum element and its location will be recorded based on the same comparison result. For several maximum elements, it returns the location of one of these elements.
Algorithm 10. Privacy-Preserving Algorithm maxLoc for Finding the First Maximum Element and its Location
Input: Data vector ½½ã of length n Output: Maximum element ½½b and its location ½½l in ½½ã 1: Let pðjÞ be a permutation of indices j 2 1; . . . ; n f g 2: ½½b ½½a pð1Þ , ½½l pð1Þ 3: for i 2 pð2Þ; . . . ; pðnÞ f g do 4: ½½c ð ½½a pðiÞ > ½½b j jÞ 5: ½½b ½½b À ½½c Á ½½b þ ½½c Á ½½a pðiÞ 6: ½½l ½½l À ½½c Á ½½l þ ½½c Á pðiÞ 7: end for 8: return (½½b; ½½l) Algorithm 11 gives the privacy-preserving version of the Gaussian elimination algorithm with backsubstitution. First, the rows of the input matrix ½½A are shuffled along with the elements of the dependent variable vector, that have been copied to ½½x, retaining the relations. On lines 5-13, the pivot element is located from the remaining matrix rows and then the rows are interchanged so that the one with the pivot element becomes the current row. Note that all the matrix indices are public and, hence, all of the conditionals work in the public setting. We check if the pivot element was zero to detect singular matrices, but we do not reveal this until nearly the end of the algorithm to preserve privacy. Here we also assume that the PDK handles division by zero without aborting.
On lines 
Algorithm 11. Privacy-Preserving Algorithm for Gaussian Elimination with Backsubstitution for a Matrix Equation Ax ¼b that Leaks if the Matrix is Singular
The main difference in the privacy-preserving Gaussian elimination algorithm is in the maxLoc function. In the original version, elements are compared one-by-one to the largest element so far and at the end of the subroutine, the greatest element and its location have been found. We basically do the same thing only we use oblivious choice instead of the straightforward if-clauses. This hides the location of the largest element until the end without finding out other relationships between elements in the vector. 
For technical reasons, it is better to representp in terms of original row labels. For that, we initially label rows of A after the shuffling with 1; . . . ; n and carry these labels through the computations. Hence, p i is not equal to the declassified output of the maxLoc operation. Instead, p i is the original label of the row after shuffling. For example, let the first maximum element be in row 4. Then p i ¼ 4, the first and fourth rows are interchanged and the matrix is reduced. In the next step, let the maximum element be again in row 4. Now p i will not be 4 but the original label, i.e., 1. Both representations are equivalent, as one can compute the outputs of maxLoc fromp and vice versa.
Let us first compare what happens if we apply Algorithm 11 with and without shuffling the rows (line 1). Let A and A Ã denote the matrix states throughout the execution of the corresponding algorithms. In the simplest case, all pivoting steps are deterministic, as there is only one element with maximal absolute value larger than zero form. In this case, we can always obtain A Ã by permuting the rows of A. This claim clearly holds at the beginning of execution. Now assume that the claim holds at the beginning of the for-cycle (line 4). Then vectorsm andm Ã will contain the same elements. Consequently, both algorithms must choose the row with the same matrix elements. The following reduction steps of the algorithm use this row to modify remaining rows. As the set of rows to be modified is the same up to the permutation of rows, the reduction step yields the same results up that point. This completes the induction.
If there are several equal maximal elements then the pivoting index p is not uniquely determined by the matrices A and A Ã . Nevertheless, we can compare the distributions ofp andp Ã . We do this by carefully aligning runs of both algorithms. We can represent such runs by the tree of events where intermediate decision nodes represent choices made by the maxLoc algorithm. As maxLoc chooses elements with the maximal absolute value with equal probability, each child is chosen uniformly when we reach such a decision node. Up to the first equality, the claim about matrices A and A Ã still holds. As the order of children in the decision node does not alter probabilities, we can align event trees so that the children match. As a result, the row with the same element is chosen in matching children and thus the matrix A Ã can be obtained by permuting the rows of A Ã . Hence, both runs of the algorithm can be represented with the same event tree such that A Ã in each leaf node can be obtained by permuting the rows of A.
Note that if we assign row labels to A before shuffling, then the pivoting indicesp andp Ã will be identical in each leaf node. Consequently, the distributions of pivoting indices will be the same. As the indices are assigned after the shuffling step, we obtain the distribution ofp by takingp Ã and applying a random permutation p to all elements, i.e., p i ¼ pðp Ã i Þ. The latter directly implies thatp is distributed as a uniform permutation.
The claim holds even if the matrix is singular and thus some A i;i ¼ 0. If the inversion operation returns a fixed value as 0 À1 all claims presented above still hold. If the inversion operation returns several values with different probabilities, then we must add additional decision nodes to the event tree. The latter, does not change the reasoning, as choices can be matched similarly to before. Hence, we get matching event trees and the claim still holds. For the same reason, the claim holds even if all arithmetical operations are imprecise and probabilistic.
To complete the proof, we must formally define the corresponding simulator construction. The latter is straightforward. We first sample the pivoting indexp and then simulate shares to match the execution dictated byp. The simulator construction is similar to the one in Lemma 3.1.
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Let us now look at LU decomposition. In the ordinary setting, this method is faster than the Gaussian elimination method. LU decomposition uses matrix decomposition to achieve this speed-up. If we can decompose the input matrix into a lower and upper triangular matrix L and U, respectively, so that L Á U ¼ A, we can use forward substitution and backsubstitution on these matrices, similarly to the process we used in the Gaussian elimination method.
Algorithm 12 gives the privacy-preserving version of LU decomposition. Note, that the elements on the diagonal of the lower triangular matrix L are equal to 1. Knowing this, L and U can be returned as one matrix such that the diagonal and elements above it belong to the upper triangular matrix U and the elements below the diagonal belong to the lower triangular matrix L without losing any information. We again find the pivot element using the maxLoc function. After the elements are exchanged, the row permutations are saved for use in the algorithm for solving the set of linear equations. As a result, the decomposition matrix and the permutations are returned. The permutations are public information but they reveal nothing about the original dataset because the rows have been shuffled before inputting them to the decomposition algorithm similarly to Algorithm 11. Algorithm 13 shows how to solve a set of linear equations using LU decomposition. The matrix rows are shuffled as in Algorithm 11 and the LU decomposition matrix is composed using the LUDecomp function. We receive the permutation that was done for pivoting purposes during the decomposition phase. Next, on line 5, elements of the vector ½½b containing the dependent variable are permuted to be in concurrence with the permutations that were performed during the decomposition phase. We do not need this step in the public setting, as the elements can be accessed using the permutation vectorq, but in the privacypreserving setting, it is more feasible to first rearrange the vector and then access the elements in order.
Forward substitution is performed on lines 6-8, using the values from the lower triangular matrix. Then, backsubstitution is performed on lines 9-11 using the values from the upper triangular matrix.
For the security argument, note that Lemma 6.2 shows that line 4 is universally composable and, thus, the entire algorithm is a straight line program consisting of universally composable operations. As such, it is also secure.
In addition to the methods based on Equation (2), we considered an iterative algorithm that tries to minimise the quadratic residuals directly to test the difference in performance and accuracy. We chose the conjugate gradient method for this quadratic programming task (1). The conjugate gradient algorithm is guaranteed to converge on a quadratic programming task in k steps, where k is the number of columns in the matrix A, provided that all computations are done without errors [56] .
As our matrix is symmetric and positive semi-definite, we can use the simplest version of this method with the fixed number of iterations that depends on the number of variables k. Considering that the initial convergence of the conjugate gradient method is rapid during a small number of iterations [56] and that privacy-preserving floating point operations are approximately as imprecise as operations with the float datatype in the normal setting, we decided to use fixed number of iterations in all of our experiments. As the largest number of variables was 10, the number of iterations was fixed to 10. We omit this algorithm in this paper, as it simply an implementation of the classical method using PDK operations.
Protocols for matrix operations including solving linear equations can be traced back to early works of Du and Atallah [57] where the authors use various algebraic masking techniques to reformulate the problem so that the main bulk of computations could be done in public. However, this approach is provably secure only if matrix elements come form the finite field. In statistics, computations are commonly done with floating-point or fixed-point numbers. As a result, algebraic masking is not applicable.
Nissim and Winreb were first to describe a cryptographically secure protocol for Gaussian elimination over an encrypted domain [58] which was later improved by [59] . However, these solutions again assume that matrix entries come from finite fields and use additively homomorphic encryption as the main tool. As such they are inherently slower by three orders of magnitude.
One can also use fast iterative methods such as Newton's or Jacobi's method for solving linear equations. Corresponding methods using additively homomorphic encryption have been proposed [60] , [61] , [62] . However, these methods are faster only for certain types of matrices which are much larger than those that occur in common statistical analyses.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RMIND
Implementation Architecture
We have built an implementation of the privacy-preserving statistical analysis tool on the Sharemind secure computation framework [25] . We used the shared3p PDK originally introduced in [36] as the computation backend. This PDK uses secret sharing among three servers to protect the confidentiality of the data and has a wide range of implemented protocols (see Section 2.2). In this setting, no computing party CP can derive information about intermediate values unless it colludes with another computing party. This scenario works well if all three parties enter sensitive data into the study and do not wish other parties to learn the values. Fig. 3 shows the architecture of the tool and how different Sharemind components were used in its implementation. We implemented a command line utility that secret-shares data from files in CSV-format to databases in the SHAREMIND servers so that each server gets one share of each private value in the input file. These tables can later be used by the RMIND tool in the analysis. RMIND is an interactive tool with a command line interface that allows the analyst to manipulate data tables and run statistical analyses. RMIND commands are parsed at the client and sent to all SHAREMIND servers, that execute the privacy-preserving algorithms. The algorithms are implemented in the SecreC 2 programming language [35] that separates public and private data on a type system level, thus also supporting the data tagging design goal of our tool.
RMIND can only perform operations for which the respective algorithm has been deployed on all SHAREMIND servers. This query restriction mechanism enforces the study plan and ensures that no unauthorised operations are performed. The three servers required by the PDK used in the current implementation must, therefore, be deployed by independent organisations interested in preserving the privacy of the data. In contrast, PDK implementations based on a single server will have more limited options to enforce query restrictions and will retain certain centralised trust.
We consciously made the choice not to build on top of an existing system (e.g., R, SPSS etc.), because their analysis algorithms are not privacy-preserving according to our definition even if they had a secure computing backend.
Privacy-Preserving Statistical Analysis Language 7.2.1 Managing Public and Private Variables
The query language of RMIND closely follows the language used by the statistical analysis tool R. In RMIND, data are stored in public and private arrays of signed integers, floating point numbers or boolean values. The language also supports public strings for names. We do not give the full language description here and focus only on the parts that are important from a privacy perspective.
Mask vectors indicating which values are available in a private vector are handled automatically by the language. For example, when adding two private vectors point-wise, the mask of the result will be the conjunction of the masks of the inputs. When a vector is filtered, the mask of the result will be the conjunction of the existing mask and the filter.
Functions can return either public or private data. For example, the load function that loads a private table from the database, returns a value representing a database with private values. However, functions that describe the sizes of tables, such as nrow and ncol functions, return public values. The values of public expressions can be printed using print. Private variables can be used in statistical analysis that may print out their result, if allowed to. Intermediate private results can also be stored in the database with store.table.
tbl <-load("db", "table") print(nrow(tbl)) store.table("db", "table2", list("x", "y"), list(tbl$x * 10, tbl$y + 100)) RMIND has several control structures like for, if, repeat and while. Arrays are indexed with rectangular brackets (a[i] ). Currently, conditional expressions in control structures and indices can only be public expressions. RMIND lets the analyst define procedures similarly to R.
Preparing Private Data for Analysis
RMIND can prepare private data for analysis using a range of transformations that result in new private data. For example, it can perform arithmetic, comparisons and logic on private data to compute new variables. Private data can be combined with public data, but the result will always be private. Running times do not include filtering of missing elements. 3 We measured the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure standalone on 1,000 test results, without the multiple tests that lead to it.
products <-tbl$column1 * tbl$column2 mask <-tbl$column < 10 There are two syntactic ways for filtering private data. There is a simpler inline version and a more flexible procedural version. The second can easily process tables.
c <-tbl$col1[tbl$col2 < 10] t <-subset(tbl, col1 < 10 & col2 != 1) Tables and vectors can be sorted and merged using the sort and merge procedures, respectively. sortedcol <-sort(tbl$col) tbl3 <-merge(tbl1, tbl2, by="key") A transformed table can be stored as a permanent table using the store.table procedure.
store.table("DS1", "My table", column.names=names(tbl3), columns=columns(tbl3))
Performance Analysis
We tested the performance of RMIND on a SHAREMIND installation running on three computers with 3 GHz 6-core Intel CPUs with 8 GB RAM per core (a total of 48 GB RAM). The computers were connected using gigabit ethernet network interfaces. While a subset of these algorithms have been benchmarked in [1] , we have optimized the implementation and redone all benchmarks for this paper using the new RMIND tool. Tables 3 and 4 show the performance of statistical operations in comparison with earlier work in [1] . We see, on average, an order of magnitude improvement in performance. A comparison with other research tools could not be done, as no other tool has a similar range of features. The performance measures should not be considered linear in the size of the input, due to the effects described in Section 2.5. 
